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Abstract 
 One of the important objectives of information security systems is providing authentication of  
the electronic documents and messages. In that, blind signature schemes are an important solution to 
protect the privacy of users in security electronic transactions by highlighting the anonymity of participating 
parties. Many studies have focused on blind signature schemes, however, most of the studied schemes 
are based on single computationally difficult problem. Also, digital signature schemes from two difficult 
problems were proposed but the fact is that only finding solution to single hard problem then these digital 
signature schemes are breakable. In this paper, we propose a new signature schemes base on  
the combination of the RSA and Schnorr signature schemes which are based on two hard problems: IFP 
and DLP. Then expanding to propose a single blind signature scheme, a blind multi-signature scheme, 
which are based on new baseline schemes. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the important objectives of the information security systems is providing 
authentication of the electronic documents and messages. Usually digital signature schemes 
are considered the most important solutions to meeting these requirements [1]. There were 
many proposals for signature schemes published based on a single hard problem such as 
factoring (FAC), discrete logarithm (DL) or elliptic curve discrete logarithm (ECDL) problems [1]. 
Also digital signature schemes from two difficult problems were proposed but most of them have 
proved to be not as secure as claimed [2-4]. 
In various types of electronic transactions, including election systems and digital cash 
schemes, user anonymity and authentication are always required. To solve this problem  
the blind signature schemes are used [5-7]. The properties of the blind signatures are the signer 
can not to read the document during process of signature generation and the signer cannot 
correlate the signed document with the act of signing. 
There were many proposals for blind signature schemes published based on a single 
hard problem such as FAC, DL or ECDL problems [8-12]. All of them remain secure and are 
resistant to attacks. However, if one finds a solution for the underlying hard problem hence 
break the corresponding signature schemes easily. In [6, 7] proposed blind signature schemes, 
which requires the simultaneous solving of two independent difficult problems. However,  
they have high complexity.   
Blind multi-signatures are signatures in which the group of signers (B) do not know what 
they are signing, thus the term “blind”. Such signatures are possible because the content of  
the message M has been “blinded” to become Mʹ before the message is provided to  
the collective to sign. Thus, the signing collective signed Mʹ and not M. Specifically, the user A 
needs the collective B to sign message M; However, A does not provide B with M but rather 
blinds M to Mʹ and then provides the blinded Mʹ to B to sign. After receiving the signed Mʹ, A 
unblinds the message to obtain the signature for M. Therefore, A has a signature for M without 
providing B with information on M. 
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In 1999, Popescu [13] presented blind multi-signatures based on elliptic curves. In 
2005, Chow et al. proposed two blind signature schemes partially based on Bilinear  
Pairings [14]. In 2011, Moldovyan [15] presented a blind signature scheme based on  
the GOST R34.10-2001 signature standard. In 2012, Nguyen and Dang [16] provided enhanced 
security for voting protocols on the Internet using blind signatures; Swati Verma et al. also 
presented New Proxy Blind Multi Signature based on Integer Factorization and  
Discrete-Logarithm Problems [17]. In 2013, Panda et al. researched blind signing authorizations 
in electronic voting processes [18]. In 2014, Hua Sun et al. proposed New Certificateless Blind 
Ring Signature Scheme [19]. In 2016, Shilbayeh et al. proposed security schemes for electronic 
voting processes [20]. In 2017, Minh et al. proposed New Blind Signature Protocols Based on a 
New Hard Problem [21]; Salome James et al. proposed Identity-Based Blind Signature Scheme 
with Message Recovery [22]. 
In this paper, we propose a new digital signature scheme from two difficult problems 
based on the RSA digital signature scheme [23] and the Schnorr digital signature scheme [24].  
We expand our functionality to construct the blind signature scheme and the blind  
multi-signature scheme. This helps new blind digital signature schemes inherit some 
advantages of the security of the signature schemes that had been proven in practice.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides the related theories and 
schemes. In section 3, we shall design a new signature scheme, which requires  
the simultaneous breaking of the factorization and discrete logarithm. We expand our 
functionality to construct a new blind signature scheme and a new blind multi-signature scheme. 
In the last section, the conclusion of our research work will be presented. 
 
 
2. Related Theories and Schemes 
The following notations are used: 
- p is a prime number, with structure p=2n+1, n q q=   with ,q q  are the strong prime 
numbers [25] 
- H is a collision-resistant hash function  
-   is a generator of order n over *
pZ  
- q|p−1: q is the divisor of p-1 
- ( )n  is the Euler function 
- e is the public key and d is the secret key in RSA 
 
2.1. Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [26] 
This problem is described as follows: Given an instance ( , , , )y p q  , where modxy p=   
for some * ,qx Z  to derive x. 
 
2.2. Integer Factorization Problem [26] 
The integer factorization problem is the following: given a positive integer n, find its 
prime factorization, i.e., find pairwise distinct primes 
ip  and positive integers ie  such that 
1 2
1 2 ... .
kee e
kn p p p=  
The eth root problem is the following: Given a group G of unknown order, a 
positive integer e G
 
and an element ,a G  find an element ,b G such that .eb a=  
 
If ,nG Z=  
with n being the product two primes p and q, and the condition that ,b G  is 
replaced by ,nb Z  we get the RSA problem. In this case the order of the group can be found 
by factoring n.  
 
2.3.    RSA Signature Scheme  
2.3.1. Key Generation 
- Choose large distinct primes p and q, and compute n = pq. 
- Choose e such that gcd( , ( )) 1.e n =  The pair ( , )n e  is published as the public key. 
- Compute d such that 1mod ( ).de n=  The pair ( , )n d  is used as the secret key. 
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- Let H and computed from the signed document M. It is proven that obtaining a private key 
from the public key is very difficult unless you know the factorization of n [1, 23].  
 
2.3.2. Signature Generation Procedure 
The signature pair can be computed easily by a signer who knows the message and 
secret key (p, q, d) as follows: mod .dS H n=  Then the ( , )M S  is the digital signature of M.  
 
2.3.3. Signature Verification Procedure 
It is easy to verify that ( , )M S is valid by checking if the following equality holds: 
mod ,eS H n=  where equality follows because 1mod ( )ed n . The hash function H is used to 
enhance security and efficiency. 
 
2.4.    Schnorr Signature Scheme 
2.4.1. Key Generation 
- Choose randomly a secret key x  with *.qx Z  Compute mod .
xy p=    
- Let H and computed from the signed document M. The public key is ( , , ).p y
 
The secret  
key is x .  
 
2.4.2. Signature Generation Procedure 
To sign a message M the signer performs the following steps: 
- Choose a random k such that 1 1.k q  −  Compute  mod .
kR p=   
- 
Compute  ( ).E H M R=  Compute modS k xE q= − . Then the pair ( , )E S  is the digital  
signature of M. The signer repeats these steps for every signature.
 
 
2.4.3. Signature Verification Procedure 
A signature ( , )E S  of a message M is verified as follows:  
- Compute 
* * *mod ; ( || ).S ER y p E H M R= =   
- Compare the values E* and E. If 
*E E=  then signature is valid. The verifier accepts a 
signature if all conditions are satisfied and rejects it otherwise. 
 
 
3.    Blind Signature Scheme based on Difficulty of Solving Simultaneously Two Difficult  
       Problems 
3.1. New Signature Scheme based on Two Difficult Problems 
To design the new blind signature scheme and blind multi-signature scheme, we first 
propose a new digital signature scheme as a basic structure of our developing blind signature 
schemes. Breaking the modified signature schemes described below requires simultaneous 
solving two different difficult problems, computing discrete logarithm in the ground field ( )GF p
and factoring n. In this signature scheme, p is a prime number, with structure 2 1p n= + . 
The following modifications have been proposed to design the new basic signature 
scheme:   is used a value having order equal to n modulo p; additional element e of the public 
key; additional element d of the private key; instead of the value S in the signature 
verification equation it is introduced the value .eS   The values e and d are generated like in  
the RSA cryptosystem. As the value e it is selected a small number (having size from 16 to  
32 bits) that is relatively prime to ( ) ( 1)( 1).n q q = − −   The value d is computed as follows 
1 mod ( ).d e n−=  The process of the basic structure is describe following: 
 
3.1.1. Key generation 
- Choose randomly an integer ne Z  such that gcd( , ) 1.e n =  
- Calculate a secret d such that 1mod ( )ed n . 
- Choose randomly a secret key x with * .px Z  Compute mod .
xy p=  The public key is  
(e, , y). The secret key is ( x , d). 
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3.1.2. Signature Generation Procedure 
- Compute mod ,
kR p=   where k is a secret random number, 1 1k n  −   
- Compute 
( || )E H M R=
 
- Calculate the value S, such that modeS k xE n= − , i.e. ( ) mod
dS k xE n= −  such that 
mod .
eS ER y p=  The signature is the pair ( , )E S . 
 
3.1.3. Signature Verification Procedure 
- Compute 
* * *mod ; ( || ).
eS ER y p E H M R= =
  
- Compare the values *E  and E . If *E E= , then signature is valid. Otherwise,  
the signature is rejected as invalid. 
Solving the discrete logarithm problem in ( )GF p is not sufficient for breaking  
the modified scheme. Now to break the signature scheme it is required to know  
the factorization of n. The solution of the discrete logarithm problem leads to the computation 
of the secret key x  and to the possibility to calculate the value 
* ( ) modS k xE n= − . However, to 
calculate the signature S  is required to extract the eth root modulo n from the value *S .  
This requires factoring the modulus n. 
 
3.2. New Blind Signature Scheme 
The proposed signature scheme using two difficult problems can be used as a basic 
algorithm for constructing blind signature scheme which is similar to the blind signature scheme 
based on the RSA [23] and Schnorr signature schemes [24]. This approach will be used to 
develop the following blind signature scheme, which requires the simultaneous solving of these 
two difficult problems. There are six rounds in the blind signature scheme.    
- Round 1 (Signer B): Selects a random value 1 1k n  −  and computes mod .
kR p=    
Then he sends R to the user A. 
- Round 2 (User A): Selects two random values  and   and computes mod .R R y p
  =  
Then user A computes ( || )E H M R
 = and .E E = − Then he sends E to the signer B.  
- Round 3 (Signer B): Computes the value mod ,D k xE n= − such that  mod .
D ER y p=   
The value of D is sent to the user.  
- Round 4 (User A): Selects a random value  < n (masking factor), computes the value 
( ) modeD D n  = +  and sends D to the signer B. 
- Round 5 (Signer B): Computes the value ( ) ( ) mod
d ed d dD D D D n    =  = + = +  and 
sent to the user.    
- Round 6 (User A): Computes the values ( , )E S  with E E  = +  and / modS D n =  .  
The signature is the pair ( , )E S  . 
Verification of Blind signature scheme: The verification procedure described in the blind 
signature scheme is the same as in the previous basic digital signature scheme, i.e., using  
the verification equation is * mod .
eS ER y p
  =   
 
3.3. New Blind Multi-signature Scheme 
Assume that user A asks the entire group B who has the authority to include n signers 
to sign document M; however, this user does not want this authorized group to know the content 
of M. First, this user blinds the document M, which becomes document Mʹ. Then, Mʹ is sent to 
the authorized signing group. This group signs Mʹ and sends it back to the requesting user. 
Then, the user unblinds Mʹ to M and checks the received signature. If the signature is valid, then 
the user has a valid signature on document M. A blind multisignature scheme has three 
participants: User A, signers B and a trusted third party (TTP). The implementation process for 
blind signing the message M includes three schemes:  
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3.3.1.  Key Generation 
- Choose randomly an integer n
e Z
 such that 
gcd( , ) 1.e n =
 Calculate a secret d such that 
1mod ( )ed n
. 
- Choose randomly a secret key 
ix with 
* .i px Z  Compute mod
ix
iy p=  and send it to TTP to 
compute y of signing group: 
1
mod , 1,2,... .
n
iy y p i n= =
 
The public key is (e, , y).  
The secret key is (
ix , d). 
 
3.3.2. Signature Generation Procedure 
- Round 1 (Signer group B): each user in the signing group selects a random value 
1 1ik n  −  and computes mod .
ik
iR p= Then he sends iR  to TTP to compute R  such as: 
1
mod
1
mod mod .
n
i
i
n k p
iR R p p
=

= =  
- Round 2 (User A): Selects two random values   and   and computes mod .R R y p
  =   
Then computes ( || )E H M R
 =  and E E = −  and sends to B.  
- Round 3 (Signer group B): each user in the signing group computes the value 
mod ,i i iD k x E n= −   such that  mod .
iD E
i iR y p=  The value of iD  is sent to TTP to computes 
D  such as: 
1
mod
n
i
i
D D n
=
=  and sends to A. 
- Round 4 (User A): Selects a random value ,n   computes the value ( ) modeD D n  = +   
and sends to B. 
- Round 5 (Signer group B): Computes ( ) ( ) mod
d ed d dD D D D n    =  = + = +  and sends  
to A. 
- Round 6 (User A): Computes the values ( , )E S  with E E  = −  and / modS D n =   
- The signature is the pair ( , )E S  . 
 
3.3.3. Signature Verification Procedure 
The verification procedure described in the blind signature scheme is the same as in 
the previous basic digital signature scheme, i.e., using the verification equation 
is * mod .
eS ER y p
  =   
 
 
4.    Analysis of the Proposed Blind Signature Security 
4.1. Correctness  
Theorem 1: The signature ( , )E S  is a valid blind signature scheme corresponding to  
the message M. 
- Blind signature Scheme: 
Proof: In accordance with the rounds 4, 5 and 6 we have 
 
( )
( )mod .
ee de
e
e e e
DD D
S D n
 + 
     + 
  
 
 
Using the condition ( )mod ,eS D n  +  correctness of the scheme is proved as follows: 
 
*
*(mod ) .
eS E D E D ER y y y y
R y p E E
  + +  
 
       
    =
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- Blind multi-signature Scheme: Instead of the value D  and R  in the proof equations in  
the blind signature scheme, it is replaced by the value D  and R . The result is like the blind 
signature scheme. 
 
4.2. Unlinkability 
In a blind signature scheme, the unlinkability property (or blindness property) makes it 
impossible for the signer to derive the link between a given signature and the instance of  
the signing scheme which produces the blinded form of that signature. Theorem 2: The scheme 
provides unlinkability property in the case when the message M and signature ( , )E S  will be 
presented to the signer.  
- Blind signature scheme: 
Proof: With equal probability of each of the users, who participated in the blind 
signature scheme, they could provide a signature on a document M. This can lead to  
the following statement: from the fact that any triple ( , , )R D E  from the set of such triples 
formed by the signer may be associated with the signature ( , )E S   of this document M.  
Indeed, since modD ER y p=  (see round 3 of the scheme) and mod ,
eS ER y p
  =   then  
the relation: (mod ) .
eS D E ER y y p
R
 − −        So, when choosing random equiprobable values  
 and , the signature ( , )E S  with equal probability could be generated with any user in  
the process of blind signing.  
- Blind multi-signature scheme: Instead of the value D  and R  in the proof equations in  
the blind signature scheme, it is replaced by the value D  and R  . The result is like  
the blind signature scheme. 
 
4.3. Randomization  
The signer had better inject one or more randomizing factors into the blinded message 
such that the attackers cannot predict the exact content of the message the signer signs. 
Theorem 3: The scheme provides randomization property.   
- Blind signature scheme: 
Proof: In the proposed scheme, attackers are infeasible to sign a valid signature ( , )E S   on 
behalf of the original signer. The signer selects a random value 1 1k n  −  and computes 
modkR p=  and sends R to the user A. To get a random value k  from R  is 
computationally infeasible (it is difficult to determine k because that the derivation is solving 
the discrete logarithm problem). Therefore, in the proposed scheme, attackers cannot 
remove the random k from the corresponding signature ( , )E S  of message M. 
- Blind multi-signature scheme: Instead of the value k and R in the proof equations in the blind 
signature scheme, it is replaced by the value 
ik  and iR . The result is like the blind  
signature scheme. 
 
4.4. Unforgeability  
It means that only the signer can generate the valid signature. The intruder may attack 
the proposed scheme by following way. Intruder tries to derive the signature ( , )E S   for a given 
message M by letting one integer fixed and finding the other one. For example, intruder  
selects E  and tries to figure out the value of S  satisfying mod
eS ER y p
  =   and vise-versa. To 
do this, intruder first chooses at random an integer R . He then computes log mode ES R y p− =
and only if two difficult problems is breakable. 
 
4.5. Performance 
The security of the new blind digital signature scheme has been proven to be equivalent 
to solving two independent difficult problems simultaneously including IFP and DLP.  
We investigate the performance of our schemes in the number of modular multiplication, 
number of hashing operation, number of random number generation, number of inverse 
computations, number of cube root and number of modular exponentiation.  
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Time for computing modular addition and subtraction are ignored, since it is much 
smaller than time for computing modular exponentiation, modular multiplication and modular 
inverse. The comparisons of computation costs performed by the user, signer and verifier 
between the proposed blind signature scheme and the scheme of [27] are summarized in  
Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
 
Table 1. The Computation Costs of the Proposed Blind Multi-signature  
Scheme and the Scheme of [27]  
Type of Operations 
Performed by the user Performed by the signer 
Our scheme [27] Our scheme [27] 
Numbers of Exponentiations 
Numbers of Inverses 
Numbers of Hashings 
Numbers of Multiplications 
Numbers of cube root 
Random number generation 
3 
1 
1 
3 
0 
3 
2 
1 
1 
5 
0 
3 
2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
Table 2. The Computation Costs of the Proposed Blind Multi-signature  
Scheme and the Scheme of [27] 
Type of Operations 
Performed by the verifier 
Our scheme [27] 
Numbers of Exponentiations 
Numbers of Hashings 
Numbers of Multiplications 
3 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
 
 
This section will compare the performance of our blind multi-signature scheme with  
the blind multi-signature scheme in [27] also design the blind multi-signature scheme, but  
the basic scheme is based on the Rabin and the Schnorr schemes and using S3 instead S in  
the Signature verification procedure. Our blind multi-signature scheme is based on the RSA  
and the Schnorr schemes and using Se instead S in the Signature verification procedure. 
From the comparison Table 1 and Table 2, we realized that the time costs of  
the proposed blind multi-signature scheme has more the time cost than the scheme in [27] with 
performed by uer and with performed by the Verifier. However, with performed by the signer,  
it is easier to perform because it is not required to extract the square 3 root to calculate the D
value ( D  is used to computing the blind signature S ). And therefore, they can be applied  
in practice. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a new signature scheme from two difficult problems IFP  
and DLP. Then expanding to propose a single blind signature scheme and a blind  
multi-signature scheme, which requires the simultaneous breaking of two independent 
difficult problems, these are based on the RSA signature scheme and Schnorr signature 
scheme. It has been proved to be correct, blind, unforged, random and provides higher level 
security than schemes that based on a single hard problem. The results show that the proposed 
blind multi-signature signature scheme are safe and present high performance; therefore, they 
can be applied in practice such as the proposed schemes can be applied in election systems 
and digital cash schemes. 
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